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Abstract 
Children chose either to maintain their initial belief about an object's identity or to 
accept the experimenter's contradicting suggestion. Both 3-4 and 4-5 year olds were 
good at accepting the suggestion only when the experimenter was better informed than 
they were themselves (implicit source monitoring). They were less accurate at 
recalling both their own and the experimenter's information access (explicit recall of 
experience), though well above chance. Children were least accurate at reporting 
whether their final belief was based on what they were told or on their own direct 
experience (explicit source monitoring). Contrasting results emerged when children 
decided between contradictory suggestions from two differentially informed adults: 3-
4 year olds were more accurate at reporting the knowledge source of the adult they 
believed, than at deciding which suggestion was reliable. Decision-making in this 
observation task may require reflective understanding akin to that required for explicit 
source judgements when the child participates in the task. 
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Children’s Suggestibility in Relation to Their Understanding about Sources of Knowledge. 
 
An interesting new development in research into children’s suggestibility involves  
examination of the relationship between children’s readiness to accept an incorrect suggestion, 
and their source monitoring skills. In the research presented here we build on this recent work. 
The general assumption made in the published work is that awareness of the sources of one’s 
knowledge can help one resist false suggestions, and this has been applied both at the level of 
competence and at the level of performance. At the performance level, failure spontaneously 
to monitor sources could lead to acceptance of false suggestions (Thierry, Spence and Memon, 
2001). A second study which could be construed as looking at performance issues is Ruffman, 
Rustin, Garnham and Parkin (2001). They tested children aged 6 to 10 years and showed, 
amongst other findings, relationships between inhibitory control, rejecting false suggestions, 
and ability to identify whether an event occurred on a video or an audio tape. 
At the competence level, Welch-Ross and colleagues have carried out several studies 
in which children’s willingness to accept false suggestions has been related to their 
understanding about beliefs. Welch-Ross (2000) suggests that on the one hand children with 
more advanced understanding of the connection between information access and knowledge 
state should be better able to resist the suggestion of an apparently uninformed other, while on 
the other hand children who can handle conflicting representations should be better able to 
avoid updating their original (true) representation on the basis of subsequent misleading input. 
Empirical support for this account comes from a study by Welch-Ross, Diecidue and Miller 
(1997). They found that 3- to 5- year olds’ performance on a battery of tasks involving false 
belief, appearance-reality and pretend-real distinctions, predicted their resistance to 
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misleading suggestions when age and memory were taken into account. Consistent results are 
reported by Welch-Ross (1999a). In addition, Welch-Ross (1999b) showed that only children 
who passed false belief tests were less likely to accept misleading suggestions from an 
interviewer who professed ignorance of the relevant events, than from an interviewer who had 
shared the same experience as the child and so could be assumed to be equally 
knowledgeable. A connection between resistance to suggestibility and understanding of 
experience as a source of knowledge is also reported by Leichtman (1996) (cited by Perner, 
2000).  
In all the above studies, children’s own direct experience was reliable, and the interest 
is in their ability to resist conflicting false suggestions. Clearly this situation is relevant to eye 
witness testimony, when what is important is that the witness can give an accurate account of 
what they themselves experienced directly, and avoid confusing that with input from indirect 
sources. In other real life circumstances, though, it can be important to believe what one is 
told even when it contradicts what one currently believes to be true. Although children would 
not fare well in the real world if they always believed whatever they were told, neither would 
they fare well if they mistrusted information from another person whenever it conflicted with 
what they already knew. It is important to make the right decisions: To believe contradicting 
new input only when it is true. 
Real life source monitoring can differ from the experimental studies in another 
important respect. In most research on children’s suggestibility and on their source monitoring 
skills, they are asked to report explicitly either the source of a particular piece of information, 
or the information received from a specified source. In real life, in contrast, much source 
monitoring activity is carried out at a procedural or automatic level: We make decisions about 
what to believe without necessarily making explicit our underlying reasoning. In the research 
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reported here, we examined children’s readiness to update their own belief in line with a 
suggestion from an adult who was or was not better informed than they were themselves. We 
were interested in the accuracy of children’s decision making in relation to their ability to 
reflect on the sources of their beliefs. Children's ability to reflect on how they know something 
is taken to be a sign of their understanding of the connection between information access and 
consequent knowledge (e.g. Gopnik & Graf, 1988; O’Neill & Gopnik, 1991; Perner & 
Ruffman, 1995). On the assumption that such understanding is necessary for correct decisions 
about whether or not to believe a suggestion from a speaker who is better or less well 
informed than oneself, we would expect that children who make correct decisions to more 
likely to report accurately the source of their beliefs. 
In contrast to work on suggestibility and on eye witness testimony, we did not expose 
children to complex sequences of events. Rather, we used procedures more akin to those used 
in work within the theory of mind tradition on children’s understanding about sources of 
knowledge (e.g. Gopnik & Graf, 1988; O’Neill, Astington & Flavell, 1992; O’Neill & 
Gopnik, 1991; Pillow, 1993; O’Neill & Chong, 2001). In this kind of procedure children 
typically experience or expect to experience a single object via a particular sense such as sight, 
touch or smell, or else are told about the object by the experimenter who has had such an 
experience. Children report or otherwise indicate how they know the object’s identity or 
property, or predict what property they can expect to identify as a result of that access. We 
modified this type of procedure, which involves access to a single source, in a way that would 
allow us to assess children’s ability to make correct decisions about which of two conflicting 
inputs to believe. In our tasks, the child either experienced an object directly and was given a 
contradicting suggestion by the experimenter (Experiment 1) or chose between the 
contradicting suggestions of two people who had different kinds of access (Experiment 2). 
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Children therefore had two sources to keep track of, as in the source monitoring studies in 
which they experience two distinct events such as real life and video events. Our procedure 
differed from these, though, in that both sources informed the child about one particular 
reality (the identity of a particular object) and the child’s task was to decide which was true.  
This procedure was developed by Whitcombe and Robinson (2000) from related 
procedures (Robinson, Champion & Mitchell,1999; Robinson, Mitchell & Nye, 1995) but 
their results were not in line with the expectation above. This expectation was that children 
who understand about the connection between information access and consequent knowledge 
state (assessed by ability to report accurately the source of their knowledge) should show a 
clearer pattern than those who do not, of accepting a suggestion from a better informed other 
and rejecting one from a poorly informed other. What Whitcombe and Robinson (2000) 
found, in contrast, was that children aged 3-4 years generally made very accurate decisions 
about whether or not to believe an adult's suggestion, whether or not they reported accurately 
the source of their final belief. For example, some children who correctly believed the adult's 
suggestion when she was the better informed, nevertheless reported that they knew the object's 
identity because they had seen or felt it, rather than because they had been told what it was. 
This result was found using two variations of the procedure outlined above. In one, a pair of 
pictures portrayed objects of the same colour, e.g. a banana and some cheese. One of the 
pictures was chosen in secret, and the aim was to find out which one it was. One player (either 
child or experimenter) saw a small uninformative part and made a guess about its identity, 
then the other player saw the whole picture and made a conflicting guess. The child was then 
asked to make a final identity judgement, which should be in line with that of the person who 
saw the entire picture. In the second procedure, based upon O’Neill, Astington and Flavell’s 
(1992) tunnel game, one of a pair of objects was placed secretly in a tunnel. To identify which 
  
7 
 
one it was, it was necessary on some trials to see its colour, and on others to feel it. On each 
trial, one player (child or experimenter) looked in the tunnel and the other felt, and again the 
experimenter contradicted the child’s suggestion. The better informed person, whether child 
or experimenter, sometimes gave their judgement first, and sometimes second. The child then 
made a final identity judgement. With both the tunnel and the picture procedures, children’s 
final identity judgements were much more accurate than their reports of the source of their 
final belief.  
Whitcombe and Robinson (2000) interpreted these results as demonstrating that the 
children who could not reflect accurately on the sources of their knowledge nevertheless 
demonstrated working understanding of the relationship between information access and 
consequent knowledge or belief, since they were sensitive to the relative informedness of 
themselves and the experimenter. If that interpretation is correct, the results might add to the 
growing literature on children’s implicit understanding about the mind in the absence of 
explicit knowledge (Clements & Perner, 1994; Garnham & Perner, 2001; Dienes & Perner, 
1999; Ruffman, 2000). In these studies, children’s eye movements, or their impulsive 
gestures, were towards the location where a protagonist falsely believed his desired object to 
be, even though children’s subsequent verbal judgements referred incorrectly to the current 
location of the object. Similarly, in Whitcombe and Robinson’s (2000) task, children’s 
nonreflective decisions appeared to be sensitive to an understanding about the mind which 
was absent from their explicit reports.  
It may be premature though to develop an argument about implicit versus explicit 
understanding about sources of knowledge. There is a plausible interpretation of Whitcombe 
and Robinson’s (2000) results which does not assume that correct decisions required 
understanding about sources of knowledge. The good decision-making of the young children 
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might not really have been based on a comparison of the reliability of the information access 
of child and adult. An alternative possibility is that children correctly accepted the suggestion 
of the better informed adult simply because they were unsure of their own initial belief when 
that was based on inadequate information access. If this alternative interpretation is correct, 
then children would be just as inclined to believe the adult's suggestion whether she was as 
poorly informed as they were themselves, or better informed. We tested this prediction in the 
first experiment reported below.  
One possible result is that only children who can report accurately the source of their 
final belief, give final identity judgements which discriminate accurately between trials on 
which both players are guessing, and trials on which only the child is guessing. This result 
would be in line with the original expectation expressed above, that (explicit) understanding 
about the connection between information access and consequent knowledge state is related to 
accurate assessment of the relative reliability of conflicting sources.  
We also tested in a different way the possibility that children relied on their own 
uncertainty when deciding whether or not to accept the adult's suggestion. Instead of gaining 
direct experience of the object themselves, children observed two adults gaining experience of 
an object in a game similar to the tunnel game described above. One adult's experience was 
sufficient for her to identify the object but the other's was not. The adults gave conflicting 
suggestions about what the object was, and the child decided whom to believe. Children who 
did not understand about the relative informativeness of the two experiences would have no 
basis for deciding correctly. If children's good decision making when they were a participant 
in the game was based only on their own uncertainty when their experience was 
uninformative, then they would be expected to perform poorly in the observer condition, since 
they had no feeling of uncertainty on which to draw. This procedure was similar to one used 
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by Povinelli, Nelson and Boysen (1990) with chimpanzees, and by Povinelli and deBlois 
(1992) with children. 
In summary, the experiments reported below are concerned with relationships between 
children’s suggestibility and their verbally explicit source monitoring skills in contexts in 
which both kinds of response can reveal understanding of the connection between information 
access and consequent knowledge state.  
Investigation 1 
  The main aim of this investigation was to check whether children's correct decisions 
about whether or not to believe the experimenter's suggestion were based simply on 
uncertainty about their own belief, or whether they were genuinely based on a weighing up of 
the relative informedness of themselves and the experimenter. If children were merely relying 
on their own uncertainty then (i) they would be no less likely to accept the experimenter's 
contradicting suggestion when both she and the child were equally uninformed than when she 
was the better informed and (ii) they would perform poorly when they had to decide which of 
two adults, one well informed and one poorly informed, to believe. On the other hand, greater 
readiness to accept the suggestion of the better-informed than the poorly informed speaker in 
either task would be in line with genuine weighing up of relative informedness of the two 
players.  
Method 
Participants. We tested 54 children (27 boys and 27 girls) from an infants’ school in 
Birmingham, UK. Thirty were from a nursery class (range, 3;7 to 4;6, mean = 4;3), and 24 
from a reception class (range, 4;8 to 5; 6, mean = 5;3). Subgroups of 3, 4 and 5 year olds were 
small, and we had no strong theoretical reasons to compare those age bands in particular, so 
we grouped children by nursery / reception class.  
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Materials. For the tunnel game, we used a cardboard tunnel with a window cut in one 
side for seeing through, and end openings for feeling. Six pairs of toys were used, three 
matched on every dimension except colour, e.g. red and blue ladybirds, and three matched on 
every dimension except feel, e.g. two snowmen, one filled with plaster of paris to make it hard 
and the other soft.  A bag was used to hide items while they were secretly moved into the 
tunnel. A lion puppet, Leo, operated by the experimenter, asked all the questions during the 
experiment. 
For the video game we used a personal video machine with a 4 inch screen. The videos 
showed a box in which one of a pair of objects was hidden. Two pairs of objects looked the 
same but felt different, e.g. two identical yellow balls, one squashy and one hard. Two pairs 
felt the same but looked different, e.g. two toy cars of the same model, one green and one red. 
Two people, Jack and Anne, appeared on the videos, as did the experimenter (EW).  
Design. Each child had ten trials, six as an active participant in the tunnel game, and 
four as an observer of the video game. In the tunnel game, children were randomly assigned so 
that they either only saw the content of the tunnel (window to child) or only felt it (window to 
experimenter). On two  trials the child was the better informed (e.g. in the window to child 
condition, the child saw an object identifiable by its colour, and the experimenter felt it), on 
two the experimenter was the better informed (e.g. in the window to child condition, the child 
saw an object identifiable by its feel, and the experimenter saw it), and on two trials both child 
and experimenter were equally poorly informed (e.g. both felt an object identifiable by its 
colour).  
For the video condition all children observed two trials in which the protagonist who 
saw inside the box was better informed, and two trials on which the protagonist who felt 
inside the box was better informed.  
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Between children the order of tunnel game and video was counterbalanced, as was 
order of conditions (child better or less well informed) within the tunnel game. The equal 
access trials in the tunnel game always came in the middle between the child better and child 
less well informed trials; since both players were guessing on the equal access trials they 
seemed an unsatisfactory start or finish to the game. Order of presentation of the forced-choice 
alternatives in both the identifying question and source question were counterbalanced.  
     Procedure. Children were tested individually. The tunnel game began with a demonstration 
of looking and feeling inside the tunnel, and children practised both. The puppet Leo was 
introduced. Each child experienced four trials on which child and experimenter had different 
access: One saw and the other felt. In the window to child (colour) condition, a trial began 
with the experimenter introducing the materials, for example  “First, we’re going to play with 
these two bugs,” placing the objects in front of the child. “How do they feel?” (prompted 
answer as necessary). “That’s right, they're both soft.” “What colours are they?” “That’s right, 
one is red and one is blue.” “Can you pass me the red one…., can you pass me the blue 
one…Thank you.” (To check naming of colours). “Now, Leo is going to hide one of the bugs 
in the tunnel, but we won’t know which one.” The puppet placed both bugs inside the bag and 
then secretly moved one into the tunnel. The child was asked to look into the tunnel through 
the window, “Have a look through the window and I’ll have a feel from my side.”  
The puppet asked the child the initial identity question, “Which bug is in the tunnel, is 
it the red one or the blue one?” Next, the puppet asked the experimenter, “Which bug is in the 
tunnel?” The experimenter’s response contradicted the child’s, whatever reality. As if puzzled 
by the contradicting responses of child and experimenter, the puppet asked the child the final 
identity question “Which one is it?” Here, the child could either repeat his/her original 
response (the correct thing to do in this example, as the child was better informed), or update 
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his/her belief to agree with the experimenter. Finally, the puppet asked the child the source 
reporting question, “How do you know it’s the red bug, because you saw / felt it, or because I 
said so?” 
In the window to experimenter (colour) condition, the experiences of child and 
experimenter were swapped, so that the child felt inside the tunnel whilst the experimenter 
looked inside. On these trials the experimenter checked by looking through the window that 
the child’s hand had explored the object.  Window to child (weight) and window to 
experimenter (weight) trials ran similarly, with minor alterations so the script would make 
sense.  
Each child also had two trials in which child and experimenter had the same 
information access and both were poorly informed. For children in the window to child 
condition, both experimenter and child looked at an object that could only be identified by its 
feel. For children in the window to experimenter condition, both experimenter and child felt 
an object that could only be identified by its colour. Apart from the fact that both players 
either felt or saw, these trials were identical in format to the differential access trials.  
For the video game children were shown the personal video player and told they were 
going to watch some people finding out about the content of a box.  A trial began with the 
experimenter seen on the video seated at a table with a box and a pair of items that differed in 
either colour or rigidity. The experimenter picked up the items, labelled them and 
demonstrated if one was squashy and the other was not. The experimenter said “I’m going to 
put one of them into my box (box picked up, opened and replaced on the table), but you won’t 
know which one it is.” The camera panned up to see just the experimenter’s head and 
shoulders as she hid one of the items in the box and removed the other from the table. The 
experimenter then left the table, leaving just the box in view.  Next, Jack entered, with the 
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experimenter’s voice explaining “Here comes Jack. He wants to know what’s inside my box. 
But Jack, he only wants to feel inside. What does Jack think is inside?” Jack was seen putting 
his hand inside the box without looking and was then heard saying “It’s the (red car)”. Next 
Anne entered, and with the experimenter’s voice over explanation as before, Anne looked 
inside and announced what she thought the object was, contradicting Jack’s suggestion. The 
experimenter’s voice over then asked the final identity question: “So which one is it? Is it the 
(red car) or the (green car) in my box?”  The video was paused and experimenter repeated this 
question in real life. Finally children were asked the source question in relation to the person 
whose identity judgement they had believed, e.g. if Jack, “How did Jack know it was the (red 
bug), did he see or did he feel inside the box?”  Each child had four video trials, two on which 
feeling was informative, and two on which seeing was informative. Jack and Anne’s 
experiences of the box content were counterbalanced: On half the trials Jack felt, and on half 
he saw, on half the trials Anne felt and on half she saw. The order of the options in the identity 
and source questions were counterbalanced between children.  
Results  
Tunnel game. First we checked whether the results for the four differential access trials 
were in line with those reported by Whitcombe and Robinson (2000). In their studies, children 
performed well in answer to the final identity question (insofar as they tended to accept the 
experimenter’s suggestion only when she was the better informed) but relatively poorly in 
answer to the source question. We gave each child two scores out of 2 according to the 
number of correct final identity judgements given on trials when the child was the better 
informed, and on trials when the child was poorly informed. Mean scores appear in Table 1.  
  
14 
 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 near here 
---------------------------- 
In line with the previous findings, performance was well above chance across all trial 
types in both age groups (chi squared test showed that the observed distribution of scores 
differed significantly from that expected by chance, with high scores over-represented and low 
scores under-represented). Children were scored as correct in answer to the source question if 
they reported the source that they had believed, whether that was right or wrong. For example, 
if the child believed the experimenter’s suggestion (final identity judgement), whether or not 
that was the correct thing to do, and then reported that s/he knew because s/he had been told, 
the source judgement was scored as correct.  Mean scores appear in Table 1.  This time only 
the reception children performed significantly better than chance (again assessed by chi 
squared tests). To compare performance on identity and source judgements, an ANOVA was 
conducted using the within child variables judgement (identity or source report) and 
informedness (child well or poorly informed), and the between child variables age (nursery or 
reception), modality (window to child or window to experimenter), order of tunnel trials and 
order of tunnel and video games. In line with the earlier findings, children were more accurate 
in their identity judgements than in their source judgements: F (1, 50) = 6.66, p = .01. In 
addition, reception children performed better than nursery: F (1, 50) = 7.45, p = .009. Children 
also performed better when they were the better informed: F (1, 50) = 29.86, p < .001. That is, 
although children generally made correct decisions about whether or not to believe the 
experimenter's suggestion, when they erred their tendency was to repeat their own identity 
judgement rather than accept the experimenter’s suggestion. They also tended to report that 
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they knew the item’s identity because they had seen or felt it, rather than because they had 
been told. There were no other significant main effects and no significant interactions.  
Since data of the kind we have in this experiment are not ideally suited to ANOVA, 
we checked the most important result using a nonparametric test. In line with the results of the 
ANOVA, 32 children gained higher scores in answer to the identity question than in answer to 
the source question, compared with 3 who showed the opposite pattern of responding: 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test, z = -4.53, p < .001.  
The important finding from the previous study was therefore replicated: Children who 
made accurate decisions about whether or not to believe the experimenter’s contradicting 
suggestion did not necessarily report accurately which source they had decided to believe. 
Source errors tended to consist of over-reporting of children's own direct source of 
information, a result also reported by Whitcombe and Robinson (2000). In addition, children's 
identity judgements were more accurate when they were the better informed, implying a 
tendency to repeat their own initial belief rather than accept the experimenter's contradicting 
suggestion. This result alone argues against the possibility that children's decisions to believe 
the experimenter's suggestion were simply based on their own uncertainty; if anything it 
seems children had to overcome a preference for their own poorly informed belief when they 
correctly accepted the experimenter's suggestion.   
Next we checked on the possibility that children’s own uncertainty was guiding their 
decisions about who to believe, rather than a comparison of their own and the experimenter’s 
informedness. We compared children’s readiness to believe the experimenter (as revealed by 
their final identity judgements) in the equal access condition, in which both child and 
experimenter were poorly informed, with their readiness to do so on the trials in which the 
child was poorly informed and the experimenter was well informed. If children were simply 
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accepting the experimenter’s suggestion because they were unsure of their own belief, we 
would expect no difference between the two trial types in the extent to which the 
experimenter’s suggestion was accepted. If, on the other hand, children were sensitive to the 
experimenter’s level of informedness, they should be more inclined to believe her when she 
was well informed than when she, like them, was guessing.  
Each child was given two scores out of 2 according to the number of times their final 
identity judgement was in accordance with the experimenter’s suggestion. We conducted an 
ANOVA with the repeated measure informedness (both players guessing or experimenter 
informed) and between child variables age (nursery or reception), modality (window to child - 
child sees, or to window to experimenter- child feels), order of trials within the tunnel game, 
and order of tunnel and video games. None of the between child variables showed any 
significant effects or interactions, and the only significant effect was for trial type: Children of 
both ages were much more likely to believe the experimenter’s suggestion when she was well 
informed (mean score 1.65, sd .59) than when she, like them, was guessing (mean score .91, 
sd .92): F (1,50) = 34.54, p < .001. Nonparametric analysis confirmed the main result: 30 
children were more likely to accept the experimenter’s suggestion when she was better 
informed than when both were guessing, compared with 4 who showed the opposite pattern: 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test, z = -4.52, p < .001.  Children did not just accept the 
experimenter's suggestion whenever they themselves were guessing.  It appears that children 
were genuinely making a comparison of their own and the experimenter’s informedness.  
 Video game. Children gained two identity scores out of 2 according to the number of 
times they correctly believed the suggestion from the person who was well informed when 
seeing was informative, and when feeling was informative. They also gained two source 
scores according to the number of times they correctly reported the source (seeing or feeling) 
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of the person whose suggestion they had believed, whether or not they believed the better-
informed person. For example, a child whose final identity judgement was based on Jack’s 
statement, and who correctly reported feeling as Jack’s source, gained a score for a correct 
source judgement whether or not Jack was in fact the better informed. The mean identity and 
source judgements appear in Table 2.  Since the source question referred to the person 
believed, absolute numbers of questions referring to seeing and to feeling differed between 
children, so only percentage scores appear in Table 2.  
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 near here 
---------------------------- 
The pattern of results in the video game looks very different from that in the tunnel 
game; this time nursery children’s source judgements were above chance, but their identity 
judgements were not.  We conducted an ANOVA with judgement type (total identity or total 
source score) as a repeated measure, and age and order of video and tunnel tasks as between 
group variables. This confirmed that children found it more difficult to answer the identity 
than the source reporting question, F (1, 50) = 18.06, p < .001; mean identity score = 2.50 
(1.21), mean source score = 3.32 (0.89). There was also a significant interaction between 
judgement type and order of video and tunnel tasks, F (1,50) =  5.79, p = .02. This was 
accounted for by higher identity scores in the video game when children had played the tunnel 
game first (mean 2.8, sd 1.33), rather than the video game first (mean 2.2, sd 1.00). Note 
though that even the better identity scores were substantially lower than those in the tunnel 
game itself (mean 3.5, sd .69). Order had no effect on source scores. We come back to this 
interaction in the discussion. In line with the results of the ANOVA, 7 of the 54 children 
  
18 
 
scored higher on the identity questions than on the source reporting question, compared with 
33 who showed the opposite pattern (Wilcoxon signed ranks test, z = -3.52, p < .001). 
  Comparison between tunnel and video games. Each child had 4 scores out of 4: For 
the tunnel task, total identity and source scores for the 4 differential access trials (combining 
across the see and feel trials), and for the video task, total identity and source scores for the 4 
trials (again, combining across the see and feel trials). For the tunnel game, the mean scores 
for the younger children were: Identity 3.33 (.75); source 2.33 (1.24). For the older children: 
Identity: 3.83 (.48); source 3.00 (1.18). For the video game, the mean scores for the younger 
children were: Identity 2.23 (1.13); source 3.26 (.83). For the older children: Identity 2.83 
(1.24); source 3.37 (.97). We conducted an ANOVA with judgement (identity or source score) 
and task (tunnel or video) as repeated measures, and age and order of video and tunnel tasks 
as between subject variables. There was a significant main effect for age: F(1,50) = 10.23, p = 
.002. There was an interaction between task (video or tunnel) and judgement (identity or 
source): F(1,50) = 60.64, p < .001. Related t tests showed that this interaction was due to a 
crossover in scores, with identity significantly higher than source scores for the tunnel task, 
but source significantly higher than identity scores for the video task. Identity scores were 
significantly higher in the tunnel task than in the video task, while source scores were 
significantly higher in the video task than in the tunnel task (all unadjusted p values < .001). 
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests showed the same significant differences, again with all 
unadjusted p values < .001. There was also a marginally significant 3-way interaction between 
task, judgement and video order F(1,50) = 4.00, p = .051. This was accounted for by higher 
identity judgements in the video task when it followed the tunnel task, as already identified in 
the analysis of the video performance alone.   
Discussion 
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Can we conclude that children who failed to report the source of their final belief, had 
genuinely compared the reliability of their own information access with that of the 
experimenter and thereby made a correct decision about whether or not to believe the 
experimenter's suggestion? Results from the tunnel and video games appear to lead to 
conflicting conclusions. The accurate identity judgements in the tunnel game, and in particular 
the strong discrimination between trials on which both players were guessing and trials on 
which only the child was guessing, strongly suggest that children were making a genuine 
comparison of their own and the experimenter’s informedness, and were not just relying on 
their own uncertainty when deciding whether or not to believe the experimenter’s 
contradicting suggestion. But had children been reliant on their own uncertainty to make their 
final identity judgements in the tunnel game, we would have expected them to perform poorly 
at identity judgements in the video game. And indeed they did. Yet the final identity questions 
in the tunnel and video tasks were exactly the same: In both the child was asked to deal with  
contradictory suggestions by deciding "Which one is it?"  Despite this superficial similarity, 
perhaps there is another factor responsible for the relatively poor performance in the video 
game.  
The significant order effect in the video game may provide a clue as to why final 
identity judgements in the video task were relatively inaccurate. Children's identity 
judgements in the video game were more accurate when they had played the tunnel game first 
(though they were still markedly poorer than in the tunnel game itself). These children may 
have been able to draw on their direct experience of seeing or feeling inside the tunnel to help 
them infer which of the two adults in the video was the better informed. Indeed, although their 
decisions were not based solely on uncertainty, uncertainty may well have played some part.  
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In contrast, children who had the video game first may have had difficulty imagining 
what experience the adults in the video were gaining when they saw or felt, and so may have 
had to rely on more abstract knowledge about aspectuality. There is ample evidence to suggest 
that such knowledge is acquired relatively late (O'Neill & Chong, 2001; O'Neill, Astington & 
Flavell, 1992; Pillow, 1993; Robinson, Thomas, Parton & Nye, 1997). In O'Neill, Astington 
and Flavell's (1992) tasks children made knowledge judgements on behalf of characters who 
either felt or saw a wet sponge while they themselves were sharing that same experience (e.g. 
"Can Bert tell just by feeling that the sponge is wet?") Three-year-olds performed poorly, and 
O'Neill et al. (1992) argue that these young children did not understand how they had acquired 
the modality specific information, and so could not correctly infer the knowledge of another 
character who shared the same experience. O'Neill and Chong (2001) also report that their 
participants had difficulty with modality specific knowledge, even though they elicited 
nonverbal responses from their participants. The nonverbal responses still demanded 
reflection on how the child had just found out about a particular property, however, rather 
than on-line decision making as in our version of O'Neill et al's (1992) tunnel task. We 
suggest, then, that although at first sight the final identity judgements in both the tunnel and 
video games demand only implicit rather than verbally explicit understanding of the 
connection between information access and knowledge, the video game demanded a more 
abstract or reflective understanding than did the tunnel game. We come back to this in the 
final discussion. 
Next we consider the relatively accurate source judgements in the video game. In this 
case the questions in the tunnel and video games were not exactly matched: In the tunnel 
game children were asked to report how they knew that the object was such and such, with 
prompts referring to their direct access (seeing or feeling) and being told. A matching question 
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in the video game would have elicited the answers "I know because Anne told me" or "I know 
because Jack told me". This would have been a test of the accuracy of children's external 
source monitoring (e.g. Foley, Johnson & Raye, 1983). Instead, we wanted to be able to check 
that wrong decisions about who to believe were not due simply to attention failure or incorrect 
memory of that person's source. We therefore asked children how the character whose 
suggestion they accepted, knew that the object was such and such, with prompts referring to 
the two direct source of access (seeing and feeling).   
It is possible, though, that children could answer the source question correctly in the 
video game without explicit understanding about sources of knowledge. We can perhaps draw 
on a suggestion made by Gopnik and Graf (1988) in relation to the standard single source 
procedure for assessing understanding of sources, in which the child either sees or is told 
about an object on each trial, and is then asked how s/he knows what it is. The suggestion was 
that when prompts are offered ("How do you know it's a such and such, is it because you saw 
it or because I told you?"), children can answer the source question correctly simply by 
reporting what happened (that they saw or were told something on that trial), without 
necessarily understanding that that was the source of their knowledge. Gopnik and Graf 
(1988) dismissed this as unlikely, but Whitcombe and Robinson (2000) argued that this could 
account for their own finding of more accurate source reporting on single than dual source 
trials. Something similar could happen in the video game. Prompts were offered (did s/he see 
or did s/he feel in the box?), so children could merely recall, for example, that Jack felt in the 
box or that Anne saw, and thereby give what appeared to be a correct source report. This 
suggestion implies that children can recall what experience each player had without 
necessarily being able to interpret that experience as the source of the player's knowledge. In 
the next experiment we check on that possibility directly, and then consider the implications. 
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Investigation 2 
 The aim of this study was to find out whether we can separate out children's ability to 
recall experiences, from their ability to report those experiences as source of a belief. To an 
adult who understands the connection between information access and consequent belief state 
it almost seems odd to make such a distinction; recalling accurately that one saw inside a box 
is virtually equivalent to knowing how one knows the colour of the object within it. In the 
adult source monitoring literature it is assumed that sources are inferred from recall of the 
details of the experience surrounding the acquiring of the belief (e.g. Johnson, Hashtroudi & 
Lindsay, 1993). Yet in principle someone who has no reflective understanding of the 
connection between experience and consequent knowledge or belief might be able to recall 
accurately the experience without going on to infer that that was the source of their belief. 
Instead of using the tunnel procedure from Experiment 1, we used a procedure from 
Whitcombe and Robinson (2000) in which one player saw the whole of a picture and the other 
person saw a small uninformative part. With this procedure, the mere recall of the experience 
"I saw all the picture" implies that the resulting belief of the pictured object's identity was 
reliable, and so "I know because I saw". Similarly, the mere recall of "I saw a little bit of the 
picture" implies unreliability in this context. "I know because I saw" does not follow. In 
contrast, with the tunnel procedure, merely recalling "I saw" or "I felt" has no such 
implications; it depends on what the identifying feature of the object was. The picture 
procedure therefore gives children the best chance of noticing a relationship between their 
experience and the source of their belief.  
Method 
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     Participants. We tested 68 children (33 boys and 35 girls) from an infants’ school in 
Birmingham, UK, 44 from a nursery class (range, 3;3 to 4;2, mean = 3;6), and 24 from a 
reception class (range, 4;4 to 5;3, mean = 4;8).  
Materials. We used the picture card task devised by Whitcombe and Robinson (2000). 
Six pairs of picture cards were used, each card depicting a single item. Items within a pair 
were the same colour, for example strawberry and tomato. Two frames were also used, one 
with a large window which allowed the entire item to be seen, and one with a small window 
which allowed only a small patch of colour to be seen. Two dolls, Jack and Anne, took part: 
Jack had supposedly drawn the pictures, and Anne supposedly wanted to know what they 
were.  
Design. Each child had 6 trials. First all children received two single source warm-up 
trials, one see and one tell. The purpose of these was to familiarise children with the two kinds 
of information access and the source question, and to provide informative feedback on their 
answers to the source question. Next, all children received four dual source trials, on two of 
which seeing was the informative source and on two of which being told was informative. For 
all children the information from the two sources was contradictory. The child was the better 
informed on some trials, and the more ignorant on others, and the well-informed person 
(whether child or experimenter) always gave his/her identity judgement second. This sequence 
of events makes better sense with this picture procedure, as argued in Whitcome and 
Robinson (2000). Results reported by Robinson, Champion and Mitchell (1998), Whitcombe 
and Robinson (2000), as well as the results of the equal access condition of Investigation 1, all 
provide good evidence that children do not just repeat the second suggestion. We therefore 
assumed that the risk of false positives due to such repetition was low.  
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     Procedure. For the two single source warm-up trials, the child saw one picture through the 
large window (and so could identify it easily), and was told about the identity of a second 
picture by the experimenter who looked through the large window. On each trial the child was 
asked to identify the object in the picture, and then to say how he or she knew that's what it 
was, with prompts (did you see it or did I tell you about it?) if necessary. Any child who 
answered the source question wrongly on these warm-up trials was given the correct answer. 
There followed four dual source experimental trials. The child was introduced to the dolls 
Jack and Anne, and was shown one of the pairs of pictures and identified what each picture 
portrayed. The experimenter then turned them face down, shuffled them and selected one in a 
way which made it clear that neither child nor experimenter knew which one it was. The child 
or the experimenter then saw the chosen picture through the small window, and said which 
one he or she thought it was (e.g. tomato). On the experimenter's turns at looking through the 
small window she deliberately gave the wrong answer. The other player then looked through 
the large window and gave the contradicting suggestion (e.g. strawberry). The experimenter 
gave the wrong answer when she looked through the large window, if by chance the child had 
chosen correctly on seeing through the small window. Hence children always experienced a 
contradiction between their suggestion and the experimenter's. The child was then asked a 
final identity question, "Anne wants to know which one it is, can you tell her?" This was 
followed by the source question “How did you know it was a (strawberry/tomato), was it 
because you saw it or I told you?” and the experience question, “Did you see all of the 
(strawberry/tomato)? Or a bit of the (strawberry/tomato)?” and “Did I see all of the 
(strawberry/tomato)? Or a bit of the (strawberry/tomato)?” were asked. The order of source 
and experience questions was counterbalanced between trials. The order of the two types of 
trial (seeing informative and being told informative) was counterbalanced between children.  
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Results  
Each child was given 3 scores out of 4, for final identity, source and experience 
judgements. As before, scores for source judgements took into account children’s answers to 
the identity question; consistency between identity response and source report gained credit. 
For example, a point was awarded for source if the child reported seeing as his/her source, and 
his/her final identity judgement was consistent with what s/he had said on seeing, even if the 
final identity judgement was incorrect.  In contrast, scoring for the experience judgements was 
independent of answers to identity and source questions. What was important here was 
whether children could report correctly the experiences (seeing all or part of the picture) of 
themselves and the experimenter. Children gained a score on the experience question only if 
they answered correctly both about themselves and the experimenter’s experience of the 
picture on that trial. Table 3 shows the mean scores for answers to the final identity, source 
and experience questions. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 near here 
---------------------------- 
From Table 3 it is apparent that children performed well at identity judgements, and 
found reporting the source of their knowledge relatively difficult, in line with the results of the 
tunnel task in Experiment 1. In contrast with their source reporting, children appeared to 
perform relatively well in answer to the experience questions. An ANOVA was performed 
with within child variable judgement (final identity/source/experience), and between child 
variables age (nursery/reception) and question order (source question before or after 
experience question). There were main effects of judgement: F (1, 64) = 54.19, p < .001, and 
age: F (1, 64) = 9.12, p < .001. There were no other significant effects. In particular, the order 
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of source and experience questions had no effect on children’s performance (p  = .20). To 
interpret the significant main effect of judgement we conducted related t tests, which revealed 
significantly higher scores for identity than source judgements: t (67) = 13.31); higher 
experience than source judgements: t  (67) = 5.39; and also higher identity than experience 
judgements: t (67) = 7.92  (all unadjusted p values < .001; adjusting for multiple post hoc 
comparisons all remain significant at <.01).  Nonparametric analyses confirmed the parametric 
ones: 58 children scored higher on identity than on source, while none showed the reverse 
pattern; 42 scored higher on experience than on source compared with 7 who showed the 
reverse pattern, and 43 scored higher on identity than on experience, while none showed the 
reverse pattern (Wilcoxon signed ranks tests, all p < .001).  
To check whether children's source reporting was more accurate on trials when seeing 
was informative than when being told was informative, we conducted an ANOVA on the 
source scores for the two trial types, with age as a between subjects factor. In this experiment, 
unlike Experiment 1 and Whitcombe & Robinson (2000), there was no significant tendency to 
over-report seeing rather than being told in answer to the source question (p =  .48). In line 
with the main ANOVA reported above there was a main effect of age: F (1,66) = 10.16, p = 
.002.  
Discussion 
 In line with Whitcombe and Robinson's  (2000) previous findings with the picture 
task, and the results of Experiment 1 with the tunnel task, children were relatively good at 
deciding when to believe the experimenter's suggestion but significantly worse at reporting the 
source of their final belief. The new finding from this experiment is the better performance on 
the experience question than on the source question: Some children could remember both 
their own and the experimenter's experience without apparently drawing on this memory to 
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answer the source question. Being prompted to recall both players’ experience did not help 
children do better on the source question. Even when children had just reported, "You saw all 
the strawberry, I saw just a bit of the strawberry", they sometimes still answered "I know it 
was a strawberry because I saw it" in preference to "I know it was a strawberry because you 
told me". Children's poor performance at reporting the source of their belief in the dual source 
tunnel and picture tasks is apparently not just due to their having forgotten what happened, 
and absence of explicit understanding about sources seems not to have been associated with  
failure to encode the experiences of themselves and the experimenter. 
 Perhaps children's source errors were due to confusion of their own experience of 
seeing with that of the experimenter. This could happen at the level of reporting: The child 
perhaps actually meant "You saw it" and not "I saw it", or it could happen at a deeper level if 
the child genuinely confused 
 his or her own experience with that of the experimenter. The possibility that source errors 
were based on such confusions was considered and dismissed by Whitcombe and Robinson 
(2000, p342): When the experimenter had felt an object and the child had seen it (or vice 
versa), children hardly ever selected the experimenter's source when answering the source 
question. We have no grounds therefore for supposing that such confusions explain source 
errors in this experiment. 
The results of Experiment 2 are consistent with (though not a direct test of) our 
suggestion above, that children’s relatively good source scores in the video task in Experiment 
1 could be due to their merely reporting what Jack or Anne’s experience was in answer to the 
source question, without necessarily understanding that experience as the source of Jack or 
Anne’s belief. Children cannot achieve good source performance in the tunnel or picture tasks 
using this strategy, since on each trial the child has both seen or felt and been told; unless the 
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child understands which of those experiences is the source of his or her final belief, s/he has 
no basis for choosing between them in answer to the source question. In traditional single 
source procedures, in contrast, as in our video game in Experiment 1, children could give a 
correct source report merely by recalling their experience on a particular trial. In the final 
discussion we consider the broader implications of these results. 
Final Discussion and Conclusions  
The main results from the two experiments are: (i) In line with previously reported 
findings, 3-4 year olds made accurate decisions about whether or not to update their own 
belief in line with the experimenter's contradicting suggestion, based on whether she was 
better or less well informed than they themselves, without necessarily being able to report 
accurately the source of their final belief. The tendency in Experiment 1 was to over-report 
their own direct access and under-report being told; (ii) Results of Experiment 2 show that 
children who misreported the source of their final belief, often recalled accurately both their 
own information access and that of the experimenter who made the contradicting suggestion; 
(iii) In Experiment 1, children were more likely to believe the experimenter's suggestion when 
she was better informed than the child, than when both players were guessing, suggesting that 
children's decisions were based on a genuine comparison of their own and the experimenter's 
information access even if uncertainty also played a role; (iv) When 3-4 year olds were 
observers of rather than participants in the game, their decisions about which of two 
contradicting suggestions to believe were not accurately based on the informedness of the 
speakers; (v) As observers, 3-4 year olds were well above chance at reporting the source of 
knowledge of the speaker they believed, though they might have answered correctly by 
recalling the speaker's experience without necessarily understanding this as a source of 
knowledge.  
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Our expectation at the outset was that the results of the tunnel and the video game 
would be consistent with each other: Either both would suggest children were reliant on their 
own uncertainty, so they would fail to discriminate between equal and differential access 
conditions in the tunnel game, and they would fail to discriminate between well and poorly 
informed speakers in the video game, or else both would suggest children were making 
genuine comparisons based on information access, so they would make correct identity 
judgements in both the tunnel and the video games. As it turned out, the results of the tunnel 
game indicate that 3-4 year olds were sensitive to the informedness of the speaker who 
contradicted their own belief, and did not just believe the contradicting suggestion whenever 
they themselves were poorly informed. In the video game though, when children were 
observers rather than participants, they seemed not to be able to make the required 
comparisons between speakers. Our interpretation is that when children participated in the 
game they could make accurate decisions about which player was the better informed, 
drawing on automatic or implicit processes. In contrast, we suggest post hoc that answering 
the very same identity test question when they were observers required more reflective or 
abstract understanding of the knowledge to be gained by seeing and feeling. Further research 
could test the accuracy of our post hoc suggestion.  
At this stage we leave it vague as to what the labels ‘automatic’, ‘implicit’, ‘abstract’ 
and ‘reflective’ might mean in terms what knowledge is represented. Dienes and Perner’s 
(1999) theoretical account of implicit and explicit knowledge is potentially relevant. Their 
broad approach is to make distinctions between representations in which only the content of 
the knowledge is explicit, in which the content and propositional attitude are explicit, and in 
which both of these are explicit and also that it is the self who holds that attitude. Their 
application of this approach within the realm of cognitive development draws on empirical 
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studies of acknowledgement of false belief (Clements and Perner, 1994; Garnham & Perner, 
2001): Implicit understanding is based on abstraction of situational regularities, whereas 
verbally explicit understanding is more theory-like and is based on causal understanding of the 
underlying processes. One difficulty with applying this account of implicit knowledge to our 
tasks is in specifying what regularities children learned which enabled them to perform well 
when they were participants in the game but poorly when they were observers. Concerning the 
more reflective knowledge, within the observer (video) condition we cannot tell whether 
children who made correct decisions about who to believe also had verbally explicit 
understanding of sources of knowledge. We suspect that what appeared to be correct source 
judgements could simply have been correct recollections of experience (for example that Jack 
felt the object in the box). Further empirical work is needed to clarify how best to describe the 
understanding revealed when children give correct final identity judgements in participant and 
observer conditions. Importantly, though, the results presented here allow us to reject the 
possibility that correct final identity judgements in the participant conditions were simply 
based on children’s own uncertainty about their initial belief. Children's successful decision 
making in the participant conditions cannot be achieved without some kind of understanding 
of the connection between information access and knowledge state. We have yet to specify 
just what form that understanding takes, and what its limitations are.    
Grounds for expecting that correct decisions in the observer (video) condition might 
be associated with explicit understanding come from results reported by Povinelli and de 
Blois (1992), though they elicited explicit knowledge judgements rather than source reports. 
In their task, children watched as an adult hid an object in one of a set of locations, though 
children could not see which particular location was used. A second adult was absent when 
the hiding took place. The adults then pointed at different locations and the interest was in 
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whether or not the child searched at the location indicated by the well informed adult. Note 
that in this procedure the ignorant adult had no relevant information access, and the 
knowledgeable one not only saw but also hid the toy, so the contrast between the two could 
have been greater than in our video task. Nevertheless, performance was poor amongst 3 year 
olds and relatively good amongst 4 year olds, so our results are not out of line with theirs. 
Furthermore, successful searching was associated with correct explicit judgements of the 
ignorance of the uninformed adult.  
We began the introduction by highlighting recent work examining the relationship 
between suggestibility and source monitoring skills. Within the context of eye witness 
testimony, it is important to know whether children are able to keep separate their own direct 
experience from subsequent indirect inputs (which could be misleading suggestions). Within a 
broader context, though, it is important that children make correct decisions about the truth of 
the matter even if that involves accepting a suggestion from another person. Here the literature 
on suggestibility may be less helpful. The study by Welch-Ross (1999b) is unusual in the 
suggestibility literature in letting children know the level of informedness of the person who 
offers the misleading suggestion. In most studies, children have no information about this, so 
have no cognitive basis for deciding whom to believe. This was also true in the condition in 
Welch-Ross's (1999b) study in which children received misleading suggestions from an adult 
who had shared their experience. With procedures of this kind, it is not obvious how accurate 
source monitoring could help children decide whether or not to believe a misleading 
suggestion. Understanding about the deficiencies of minds might help children accept the 
possibility that two people could have different recollections of the same event, but will not 
necessarily help them decide which person's recollection is the more accurate. Presumably 
suggestibility will be heavily determined by non-cognitive factors when the information 
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necessary for making a rational assessment of the reliability of the suggestion is unavailable. 
Our results presented here suggest that in very simple situations, when it is possible to assess 
the relative reliability of one's own belief and that of the person making a contradicting 
suggestion, young children can make accurate decisions and to that extent are not suggestible.  
In contrast to their accurate decision making when they were participants in the game, 
children's source monitoring was relatively weak. Their tendency in Experiment 1 was to 
over-report their own direct access, whether this was seeing or feeling, when asked for the 
source of their final belief. Children could just have had a superficial response bias towards 
saying “I saw” or “I felt” rather than “You told me”. It seems more likely, though, that their 
bias was to attribute knowledge to direct access rather than to indirect access. Over-reporting 
of direct access is similar to findings by Ratner, Foley and Gimpert (2002) who found over-
attributing of actions to the self amongst 5 year olds. These authors argue that such source 
monitoring errors can have benefits. They interpret their results within a Vygotskian 
framework, suggesting that recoding of another's actions as one's own is related to 
comprehension of the social acts of the other, and may contribute to internalization of 
knowledge. We might speculate along similar lines that a bias towards interpreting one's 
knowledge as being based in one's own direct experience, despite in fact being sensitive to the 
reliability of what one is told, could have the benefit of contributing to feelings of self-
efficacy.  
Finally, we consider the implications of the result from Experiment 2, that children 
were more accurate at recalling the experiences of themselves and the experimenter, than at 
reporting the source of their final identity judgement. This suggests that children could have 
available the information necessary to infer the source of their belief without being able to 
make that inference. This result is in line with the view that young children’s poor source 
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reporting is not just due to memory failure (O’Neill & Gopnik, 1991). An associated view is 
that young children suffer from something equivalent to extreme source amnesia (O’Neill & 
Chong, 2001). These authors suggest that children are unable “to become explicitly or 
declaratively aware of the source of perceptual experiences, perhaps as a result of an inability 
to process the source at the time of learning the perceptual information” (p814). In O’Neill 
and Chong’s study, 3 year olds were very poor at repeating an action which had been used to 
identify a particular property of an object, such as leaning over to smell some bubble bath, in 
response to “How did you find out?” We do not know whether the children would have been 
able to repeat the action had they been asked “What did you just do?”, which might have been 
more equivalent to our experience questions “Did you/I see all of the strawberry or just a bit 
of the strawberry?” That is, it is possible that children in O’Neill and Chong’s study failed to 
encode their source as a source, but nevertheless did encode the relevant experience. If so, it 
would be inappropriate to draw a parallel with adult amnesic patients who presumably do not 
lack the relevant abstract understanding of the connection between experience and knowledge. 
Another difference between elicitation of recalled experience, and O'Neill and Chong's (2001) 
procedure, is that we offered prompts whereas theirs was an open question. We suggest below 
that this difference in procedures might be important, and in this case might account for the 
apparent relative ease of our task. 
Our assumption so far is that for children who passed the experience questions but 
failed the source questions, all that was missing was explicit understanding about the 
connection between experience and knowledge. Another possibility, though, is that the nature 
of the memory was different in a child who interpreted the experience as the source of their 
belief and a child who failed to do that. Perhaps the latter child failed to recollect his or her 
experience as having been experienced, that is as an episodic memory in the strongest sense 
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(Dienes & Perner, 1999; Tulving, 1985). Perner and Ruffman (1995) argue on the basis of 
indirect evidence for a developmental relationship between ability explicitly to report sources, 
and holding of episodic memories. According to their account, children would be unable to 
recall their experience as an experience without also being able to treat the experience as the 
source of their knowledge. Episodic memory is normally assessed by free recall. In contrast, 
we offered children prompts (did you see all or part?). It remains a possibility that had we 
asked open questions, we would have found no difference in difficulty between experience 
and source judgements. This possibility is worth pursuing, but it is nevertheless important to 
know that when given prompts, children clearly can access both their and the experimenter’s 
experiences without seeing any implications for the source of their final belief.  
In summary, the results presented here put young children's well documented source 
monitoring errors in a broader context of sensitivity to source reliability, and accurate memory 
for their own and their partner's experience, at least under some conditions. 
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Table 1. Mean  scores (sd) gained in response to the final identity and source questions in the 
tunnel game in Experiment 1.  Max. score = 2; Chance score = 1. 
 
Age 
 
Judgement 
Window to child 
Child sees 
Window to experimenter 
Child feels 
  Child well 
informed 
Child poorly 
informed 
Child well 
informed 
Child poorly 
informed 
Identity 
judgement 
1.80 
(.41)** 
1.53  
(.64)** 
1.87  
(.35)** 
1.47  
(.64)* 
Nursery 
3-4 years 
 Source 
judgement 
1.13 
(.74) 
1.13 
(.83) 
1.27 
(.70) 
1.13 
(.83) 
Identity 
judgement 
2.00 
(.00) 
1.75  
(.62)** 
2.00  
(.00) 
1.92  
(.29)** 
Reception 
4-5 years 
 Source 
judgement 
1.58 
(.67)** 
1.42 
(.67)* 
1.58 
(.67)** 
1.42 
(.79)* 
*   sig above chance at .05 level 
** sig above chance at .01 level 
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 Table 2. Mean (sd) identity and percentage source scores gained in the video game in 
Experiment 1.  Max. score = 2; Chance score = 1. 
 
Age Identity judgements Source judgements 
 Seeing 
informative 
Feeling 
Informative 
Seeing 
informative 
Feeling 
informative 
Nursery 
3-4 years 
 
1.10 
(.69) 
1.17 
(.75) 
86.5% 
(22.5)** 
76.5%  
(34)** 
Reception 
4-5 years 
 
1.46 
(.83)* 
1.38 
(.71)* 
81.5% 
(32.5)** 
87.5 % 
(22)** 
*   sig above chance at .05 level 
** sig above chance at .01 level 
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Table 3. Mean scores (sd) gained in response to final identity, source and experience questions 
in Experiment 2. Max score = 4.  
Age group Identity Source Experience 
Nursery,  
3-4 years  
3.75 
(.49)** 
1.41 
(1.13) 
2.61 
(1.20)** 
Reception,  
4-5 years 
4.00 
(00)** 
2.42 
(1.44) 
2.95 
(1.16)** 
** sig above chance at .01 level 
 
